



United States Air Force Counter-CBW Readiness



Counterproliferation

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**ENTIRE BRIEFING
UNCLASSIFIED**





Counterproliferation Guidance



Defense Planning Guidance



Fiscal Years
2000 - 2005

April 1998

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“The threat or use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) is a likely condition of future warfare ... U.S. forces, using accurate assessments from the intelligence community, continue to improve their ability both to locate and destroy such weapons and to defend against and manage the consequences of CBW if they are used...”




Evolution of USAF Counterproliferation Efforts



- ◆ **Post-Cold War euphoria - “the threat was over”**
- ◆ **“If CBW, evacuate and fight from elsewhere”**
 - ◆ **Survive vs operate**
 - ◆ **Insufficient resources**
- ◆ **Globalization of the threat, decline in force structure, and terrorist incidents**
- ◆ **USAF **must** be prepared to halt or counter CBW or continue sustained operations**



USAF Counterproliferation Direction





CBW Readiness Effort



Purpose:

- ◆ **Lead Air Staff and MAJCOMs to examine USAF's current CBW readiness**
- ◆ **Make recommendations to address the shortfalls**
- ◆ **Establish criteria for measuring and reporting CBW readiness**



Readiness Review Process



- ◆ **AO-level working group - 92 reps from Air Staff & MAJCOMs**
 - ◆ **Identified operational & enabling standards**
 - ◆ **Identified shortfalls in meeting these standards**
 - ◆ **Suggested specific improvements**
- ◆ **DCS-level conference on 13 Oct**
- ◆ **XO message detailing results and CSAF message directing readiness**



OSD Spectrum of CBW Ops





Themes: Meeting the CBW Challenge



- ◆ **USAF must improve capability to meet CBW challenge**
 - ◆ “Pockets” of capability
 - ◆ Survive vs operate
 - ◆ Adversary capability vs intent
- ◆ **Fixes are known but not yet adopted**
- ◆ **Operational requirements shape enabling standards**
- ◆ **Standards to jump start the process**
 - ◆ Size problem & fixes
 - ◆ Provide means to measure progress
 - ◆ Focus leadership attention
- ◆ **CBW Readiness enhances**



Operational Standards

- ◆ **Resume operations**
 - ◆ **MTW: NLT 2 hours**
 - ◆ **Force Projection: NLT 4-6 hours**
 - ◆ **CONUS: NLT 2-4 days**
- ◆ **Sustain operations**
 - ◆ **MTW: for 4 days**
- ◆ **Minimize casualties**
 - ◆ **< 2-5% beyond personnel contaminated**


What enabling standards are required to support expeditionary operations?



Standards-Based Performance: An Example



Example: Tasks & Standards to Resume Ops in 2 Hrs*



*ensuring sustainability with smart CONOPs to reduce MOPP


- Ops context determines how fast - how well
- Common tasks with different time lines and level of thoroughness



Recommendations: Organize



- ◆ **Develop integrated, operational CONOPs**
- ◆ **Establish MOUs/MOAs**
- ◆ **Develop ground-based intelligence capability**
- ◆ **Reassess manpower allocations**
- ◆ **Institute standards-based evaluation & monitoring (DOC, SORTS)**
- ◆ **Consider single POC for CBW**





Recommendations: Train



- ◆ **Focus training on operating**
- ◆ **Institutionalize training**
 - ◆ **Leadership**
 - ◆ **Non-mobility personnel**
- ◆ **Train prior to deployment**
- ◆ **Conduct regular and realistic base-wide exercises**





Recommendations: Equip




- ◆ **Fund C-CBW Operations Roadmap**
- ◆ **Fund CONUS Baseline Equipment List**
- ◆ **Eliminate medical short**
- ◆ **Designate NBC equipment WRM, investigate pre-positioning**
- ◆ **Put warning infrastructure in place**
- ◆ **Institute tailored UTCs**






USAF Counter-CBW Readiness Vision

- The Air Force can survive and operate in chemically and biologically contaminated environments
- Need an integrated approach for sustained expeditionary and enabling operations





CBW Readiness Implementation Plan



Increasingly CONUS-Based Expeditionary Operations



Implementation Plan

Doctrine

- ◆ Core beliefs are right
- ◆ CBW contamination is an Ops concern
- ◆ Add readiness context to C-CBW Doctrine

Guidance

- ◆ Institute integrated, Commander-led response
- ◆ Disseminate overarching AFI

CONOPS

- ◆ Institute mission-oriented, team approach

DOC Statements

- ◆ Add C-CBW to existing narrative and



Implementation Plan

Report

- ◆ Change reporting process to reflect C-CBW readiness

Program and Budget

- ◆ Leverage Joint programs
- ◆ MAJCOMs POM for O&M

Train and Exercise

- ◆ Include sustaining ops in AEF training cycles

Test and Experiment

- ◆ More testing with lessons learned application

Evaluate

- ◆ C-CBW readiness to sustain ops



Implementation Plan: Success Requires Team Effort



Air Staff
AF/XO
AF/IL
AF/SG
SAF/AQ
AFRC
AFNG
MAJCOMs
AFRL

Endorse

Resource

Evaluate

Refine

Assign

Track

C-CBW
Operational
Readiness



BACKUPS



Sample of Shortfalls Tied to Standards

Tasks	Standards	Shortfalls
Warn	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Personnel notified w/in 1-15 Min	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Insufficient warning infrastructure
Detect	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Deploy chem detection network covering 100% of base, deployed w/in 1 Hr• 100% of personnel trained to read/report M8/M9	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Lack of detectors or maintenance• CONOPs lacking• Lack of BSPs• Training/exercises insufficient
Assess	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Identify agent type w/in 15 Min• Id specific agent w/in 60 Min	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Not sufficient personnel w/ expertise• Detector technology underdeveloped
Protect	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cover equipment w/in 15 Min• Medical capability to treat patients in C-CW environment• All MEP able to don IPE IAW AFM 32-4005	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Need CARM/tarps, training, BSPs• Insufficient medical supplies and expertise• Non-mobility personnel, CIVs, and local nationals are not trained
Contain	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Isolate clean/dirty areas w/in 60 Min• 100% personnel able to perform immediate decon	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Training, exercises lacking (need total base involvement)• Lack of decon materials, training, and distribution plan
Sustain	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• All MEP able to perform wartime tasks in MOPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Training, exercises insufficient



MTW Enabling^{Back-}Standards

- **Able to notify all mission essential personnel (civilian, contractors, TCNs/LCNs) of any change in status or attack w/in 1 Min**
- **Maintain 24 Hr Battle Staff operations**
- **Disperse and cover mission essential equip in 15 Min**
- **100% of personnel able to don MOPP within AFM 32-4005**
- **Chemical detection network covering 100% of installation operable within 60 Min**
- **Able to identify chemical agent type, contaminated areas and collateral damage within 15 Min; identify chemical agent within 60 Min**
- **100% personnel trained to recon area**
- **Medical system able to treat 20% of base population as contaminated casualties**
- **100% of mission essential personnel (MEP) have access to ColPro facilities**
- **MEP able to perform wartime duties for up to 4 Hr with limited degrade in MOPP-4**



Back- *APOE Enabling* *Standards*

- **24 Hr operations; 100% coordination with FBI and other civilian entities on CW warning and indicators**
- **AD and MEC, as well as base population notified of potential CW attack w/in designated times**
- **CONOPs in place and exercised base-wide annually (with no simulation) covering and securing 100% of mission essential equipment and facilities within 60 Min**
- **100% of AD and MEC have access to a mask, fitted for life**
- **100% of mission critical deployment areas covered with detectors**
- **Medical personnel 100% ready to administer antidotes and antibiotics as dictated by agent and previous protective countermeasures**
- **First Responders trained to respond as if CW is present**
- **Sufficient DRF to determine presence of agent in key areas w/in 30 Min**
- **Medical personnel trained to perform triage/stabilize patients**



Back- up *Other Bases*



- **24 Hr operations; 100% coordination with FBI and other civilian entities on CW warning and indicators**
- **Higher level of security that includes CW awareness**
- **100% of DCG notified of potential CW attack**
- **100% of initial and follow-on responders notified of potential CW attack**
- **Existence of means to activate DCG response force and C² network**
- **CONOPs in place and exercised re: covering and securing all facilities**
- **100% of available DCG receives antidotes**
- **Implement mutual assistance MOAs with civilian authorities**
 - **100% of First Responders have access to PPE (Personal Protective Equip)**
 - **100% of First Responders respond in PPE**
 - **100% of responding elements have detection equipment**
 - **Notify 100% of base population in a timely and effective manner**



Back-
up
(Proposed)

STATUS OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING SYSTEM (SORTS)
DESIGNED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (DOC) STATEMENT (SEE AFI 10-201)

EFFECTIVE: 07DEC98 (01NOV98)
FFK3RO

OPR: HQ ACC/DOTO, DSN 57404099 SBRPT:

.(U) UNIT IDENTIFICATION:

UNIT 0070 FS

UTC: 3FVDA

UIC: FFYZ20

LOCATION: MOODY AFB GA

.(U) MISSION IDENTIFICATION:

.(U) MISSION TASKING NARRATIVE. THIS UNIT HAS A WARTIME
MISSION TO. . . **THIS UNIT WILL BE PREPARED TO SUSTAIN
OPERATIONS IN A CBW CONTAMINATED ENVIRONMENT FOR 4
DAYS (at C2 or better)**

.(U) MEASURED RESOURCE AREAS:

.(U) PERSONNEL

TOTAL UTC. CRITICAL - USE AFSCS FROM AFI 10-201, TABLE 4.4

.(U) EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ON HAND:

COMBAT ESSENTIAL

SUPPORT

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

* MOBILITY BAGS

(RICDA REMARK

ONLY)



Back-
up

DOC Statement CES

(Proposed)

STATUS OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING SYSTEM (SORTS)
DESIGNED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (DOC) STATEMENT (SEE AFI 10-201, AND ACC SUP1)

EFFECTIVE: 01JUN98 (02JUN97)
FFC370

OPR: HQ ACC/CEXX, DSN 574-7659

SBRPT:

.(U) UNIT IDENTIFICATION:

UNIT 0001 CES

UTC: 4F7AA

UIC: FFD380

LOCATION: LANGLEY AFB VA

DOC TITLE: PRIME BEEF - MOBILITY

DOCID: NM22

DOCNR: 1 PRIMARY MISSION (MASTER/ACTIVE)

.(U) MISSION IDENTIFICATION:

.(U) MISSION TASKING NARRATIVE. THIS UNIT HAS A WARTIME MISSION TO:
.(U) PROVIDE LEAD AND FOLLOW CE PRIME BEEF, DP, AND A FIRE FIGHTING
TEAM OF ENGINEERING SKILLS TO PROVIDE FORCE BEDDOWN USING
EXPEDIENT OR EXISTING FACILITIES; OPERATIONS AND MAINT SUPT FOR
FACILITIES/UTILITIES DURING CONTINGENCIES; EMERGENCY AND FOLLOW-
ON DAMAGE REPAIR AT MOBS, COBS, FOLS, AND BBS; COORDINATES
CONVENTIONAL WARFARE SURVIVABILITY AND DEFENSE, AND **COORDINATES
NBC DEFENSE**, AND CRASH RESCUE/FIRE SUPT. **THIS UNIT WILL BE
PREPARED TO SUPPORT SUSTAINED OPERATIONS IN A CBW-
CONTAMINATED ENVIRONMENT FOR 4 DAYS**

.(U) MEASURED RESOURCE AREAS:

.(U) EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ON HAND:

COMBAT ESSENTIAL
SUPPLIES

SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND



Back-
up

Expeditionary Eligible Force



- **Over 2/3 of force deployable**
 - **90,000 forward**
 - **143,000 CONUS-based**



Back-up *IG Criteria*

Proposed scoring program for unit's ability to respond to "pre-hostility" chemical/biological incidents

Points	Estimate of Unit Preparedness
86-100	Well Prepared
72-85	Prepared
63-71	Moderately Prepared
50-62	Suspect
40-49	Extremely Suspect
39 or less	Virtually Unprepared

Using proposed format, recommended modifying scoring program to level the playing field by providing realistic expectations for all AF installations

Possible revision to scoring program

Points	MTW Preparedness	APOE Preparedness	CONUS Preparedness
86-100	Well Prepared		
72-85	Prepared		
63-71	Moderately Prepared	Well Prepared	
50-62	Suspect	Prepared	Well Prepared
40-49	Extremely Suspect	Moderately Prepared	Prepared
39 or less	Virtually Unprepared	Suspect	Moderately Prepared



Back-up *IG Criteria*



Proposed scoring program for unit's ability to respond to chemical/biological attacks

Points	Estimate of Unit Preparedness
128-150	Well Prepared
108-127	Prepared
98-107	Moderately Prepared
80-97	Suspect
60-79	Extremely Suspect
59 or less	Virtually Unprepared

Using proposed format, recommended modifying scoring program to level the playing field by providing realistic expectations for all AF installations

Possible revision to scoring program

Points	MTW Preparedness	APOE Preparedness	CONUS Preparedness
128-150	Well Prepared		
108-127	Prepared		
98-107	Moderately Prepared	Well Prepared	
80-97	Suspect	Prepared	Well Prepared
60-79	Extremely Suspect	Moderately Prepared	Prepared
59 or less	Virtually Unprepared	Suspect	Moderately Prepared